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EMPLOYMENT LAW
M. Christina Floyd*
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been a variety of developments in employment
law since the Annual Survey of Virginia Law last included an
article on this topic. This article focuses primarily upon two
significant areas: (1) wrongful discharge and (2) employment
contract claims which have been litigated since September
1996. Public sector employment,' unemployment compensation,
and workers' compensation 2 are not addressed in this article.
* Staff Attorney, Metro Information Services, Virginia Beach, Virginia. B.S.,
1982, M.S., 1988, Virginia Commonwealth University; J.D., 1992, University of Rich-
mond School of Law.
1. Although public sector employment actions are not addressed by this article,
it should be noted that several decisions in the area of grievance procedures were
handed down in 1997. See, e.g., Hagan v. Fairfax County, 43 Va. Cir. 555 (Fairfax
County 1997) (holding that a public employee not in compliance with grievance pro-
cedures is entitled to notification of non-compliance and allowed time to correct proce-
dural errors); Blue Ridge Community Servs. v. Beck, 43 Va. Cir. 377 (Roanoke City
1997) (holding that a list of grievable issues found in Virginia Code section 2.1-
116.07(A) is not an exclusive list); Creecy v. City of Richmond, 42 Va. Cir. 499 (Rich-
mond City 1997) (holding that grievance hearings were wrongfully denied on failure
to promote claims); Jones v. City of Richmond, 42 Va. Cir. 342 (Richmond City 1997)
(holding that grievance hearings are not required where there was no legal right to
relief).
2. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued several opinions in the
workers' compensation context which bear noting. See, e.g., Falls Church Constr. Co.
v. Laidler, 254 Va. 474, 478, 493 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1997) (holding that "concealment bf
a material fact on an employment application constitutes the same misrepresentation
as if the existence of the fact were expressly denied" and noting that its earlier deci-
sions eliminated the requirement that the employer also establish a causal relation-
ship between the misrepresentation and the work injury); Augusta County Sheriffs
Dep't v. Overbey, 254 Va. 522, 492 S.E.2d 631 (1997) (holding that in cases under
the Heart-Lung presumption of Virginia Code section 65.2-402, an employer does not
have to exclude the mere possibility of a work-related cause); Moore v. Virginia Int'l
Terminals, Inc., 254 Va. 46, 486 S.E.2d 528 (1997) (holding that an employee covered
by both the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Act may claim benefits under either statute, but is
only entitled to a single recovery for injuries; as such, the employer is entitled to a
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II. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The most significant development in Virginia employment law
in recent years was the decision of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in Doss v. Jamco, Inc. s The supreme court in Doss held
that the Virginia Human Rights Act ("VHRA") prohibits a com-
mon law cause of action based upon public policies reflected in
the VHRA.4 The defense bar has heralded the decision as the
end of Lockhart5 wrongful discharge claims while plaintiffs'
attorneys contend claims based on other public policy sources
remain viable.
In Doss, Jamco hired an employee who was scheduled to
report for work on March 11, 1996. During her interview, the
employee was told that individuals hired would not be allowed
to take leave during the company's busy season. Prior to begin-
ning work, Doss learned that she was pregnant, a fact she re-
ported to her supervisors when she arrived for work. The next
day her supervisors informed Doss that her employment was
being terminated because she would be out on maternity leave
during Jamco's busy period.6
Doss sued Jamco in federal court for alleged pregnancy dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") and Virginia public policy as embodied in the
VHRA.' The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia entered a stipulated order of certification which
certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia: "Does Va. Code § 2.1-725(D) prohibit a common law cause of
action based upon the public policies reflected in the Virginia
dollar-for-dollar credit for benefits it paid under the Longshoremen's Act against bene-
fits awarded to the employee under the Virginia Act).
3. 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
4. See id. at 372, 492 S.E.2d at 447.
5. Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328
(1994). Lockhart involved companion claims of two employees who alleged they were
wrongfully discharged from employment because of race and gender. Relying on the
narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine recognized in Bowman v. State
Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed dismissal of the employees' claims, finding that they had stated a common
law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See id. at 106, 439
S.E.2d at 332.
6. See Doss, 254 Va. at 365, 492 S.E.2d at 443.
7. See id.
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Human Rights Act, Va. Code § 2.1-714 et. seq?"8 In a unani-
mous decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia answered the
certified question in the afirmative The supreme court found
that the General Assembly clearly intended to alter the com-
mon law rule with respect to "causes of action based upon the
public policies reflected in the Act," when it amended the
VHRA in 1995 by adding subsection D to section 2.1-725 of the
Virginia Code.'0
Rejecting Doss's contention that the 1995 amendments to the
VHRA effected no change, the supreme court opined that the
amendments manifest the General Assembly's intent to alter
common law claims "by providing that such causes of action
'shall be exclusively limited to those actions, procedures and
remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or state civil
rights statutes or local ordinances.'"" The supreme court stat-
ed:
This is what the Act as amended says, and this is the
meaning that must be given to the Act to carry out the
clear intent of the General Assembly. To say, as Doss would
have us say, that the 1995 amendments changed nothing
would render meaningless the General Assembly's use of
the words "exclusively limited" and reduce to an absurdity
its creation of a statutory cause of action against employers
of more than five but less than fifteen persons.'
The supreme court noted that Doss based her claim for
wrongful discharge on the public policy of Virginia as expressed
in the VHRA and Title VII." Her claim, however, was limited
to consideration of the public policies reflected in the VHRA by
virtue of the certification order. Thus, the supreme court ex-
pressed no opinion concerning Virginia public policy as it may
be expressed in sources other than the VHRA.'4 With this sim-
ple pronouncement, the supreme court left open the door for
8. Id. at 365, 492 S.E.2d at 443.
9. See id at 372, 492 S.E.2d at 447.
10. Id. at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 447.
11. Id. at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725(D) (Cum.
Supp. 1998)).
12. Id
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
14. See Doss, 254 Va. at 366, 492 S.E.2d at 443.
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common law wrongful discharge claims based upon avenues
other than the V.HRA. For example, Bowman claims based on
other articulations of public policy besides the VHRA will most
likely be pursued.
In Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,"5 bank employees
were discharged after they failed to vote their stock according
to corporate management's wishes. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that such action violated the public policy articulated
in Virginia Code section 13.1-662, which allows shareholders to
vote free of duress and intimidation by corporate manage-
ment.16 In addition, the supreme court acknowledged other
public policy exceptions to employment-at-will. 7 Because Bow-
man did not rely on the public policy articulated in the VHRA,
discharged employees may continue to assert wrongful dis-
charge claims based on other sources of public policy.
Prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling in Doss, Vir-
ginia courts came to differing conclusions as to whether
Lockhart had been abrogated by the 1995 amendments to the
VHRA and whether a Bowman claim may be based on other
sources of public policy. 8 For example, in Janacek v. Mobil
Corp.,"9 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia ruled that the 1995 amendments to the VHRA
15. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
16. See id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
17. See id. (citing Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn.
1980) (at-will employee fired in retaliation for his insistence that his employer comply
with state laws relating to food labeling); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975)
(employee fired for refusing employer's request to ask for excuse from jury duty);
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (employee discharged
for refusal to perform an illegal act); Harless v. First Natl Bank -in Fairmont, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W:Va. 1978) (bank employee discharged in retaliation for his efforts to
require employer to comply with state and federal consumer credit protection laws).
18. See, e.g., Janacek v. Mobil Corp., No. 96-1832-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5327
(E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 1997) (holding that the 1995 VHRA amendments did not nullify
Lockhart); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech. Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same as
Janacek); Parker v. Family Servs. of Tidewater, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 433 (Norfolk City
1997) (holding that the 1995 VHRA amendments nullified Lockhart); Tingle v.
Chasen's Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 451 (Norfolk City 1997) (same as Parker);
Lundy v. Cole Vision Corp., 39 Va. Cir. 254 (Richmond City 1996) (same as Janacek);
Molina v. Summer Consultants, Inc., Law No. 152715 (Fairfax County 1996) (same as
Janacek); Holmes v. Tiedeken, 36 Va. Cir. 491 (Richmond City 1995) (same as
Janacek).
19. No. 96-1832-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5327, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 1997).
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did not preclude a common law cause of action for wrongful
discharge.20  The court relied on the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision in Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc.,21 in which
the supreme court held that a wrongful discharge claim based
on public policy could proceed.'m The district court found signif-
icant the Supreme Court of Virginia's pronouncement in Bailey
that, "we perceive of no reason why we should overrule or re-
treat from our holding in Bowman and Lockhart, and we de-
cline [defendant's] invitation that we do so."'
On the other hand, the majority of courts considering the
issue prior to Doss concluded that the 1995 amendments to the
VHRA abrogated common law wrongful discharge claims.' 4 In
addition, most courts have refused to look beyond the VHRA for
a source of public policy to support a wrongful discharge
claim.
Because the Supreme Court of Virginia did not address, the
issue of alternate sources of public policy in Doss, the most
litigated issue in Virginia employment law will continue to be
whether a common law claim for wrongful discharge may be
20. See id. at *7.
21. 253 Va. 121, 480 S.E.2d 502 (1997).
22. See id. at 126, 480 S.E.2d at 505.
23. Janacek, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5327, at *5 (quoting Bailey, 253 Va. at 126,
480 S.E.2d at 505); see also Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 959 F. Supp. 742 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (allowing a common law wrongful discharge claim to proceed based on the
Supreme Court of Virginia's lack of consideration of the effect of VHRA amendments);
Glaser v. Titan Corp., 12 VA. LAW. WKLY. 203 (July 22, 1997) (allowing common law
wrongful discharge claim based on the VHRA and the Fairfax County Human Rights
Ordinance).
24. See, e.g., Wilt v. Water & Waste Water Equip. Mfg. Ass'n, 43 Va.-Cir. 118
(Loudoun County 1997) (holding that the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge is
that provided by the VHRA or federal statutes prohibiting discrimination); Parker v.
Family Servs. of*Tidewater, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 433, 436 (Norfolk. City 1997) (holding
that VHRA provides an exclusive state remedy for racially motivated discharge from
employment).
25. See, e.g., Valentine v. Roanoke Podiatry & Foot Surgery, P.C., No. 96-883-K,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8064, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 15, 1997) (holding that a wrongful
discharge claim cannot be based on the public policy expressed in Virginia Code sec-
tion 65.2-308, prohibiting discharge based on a workers' compensation claim); Perry v.
American Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2521, at *1
(E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 1997) (holding that a common law claim may not be based on FDA
regulations or on failure to provide "reasonable notice"); Andrews v. Bon Secours-St.
Mary's Hosp., 43 Va. Cir. 486 (Richmond City 1997) (refusing to find a public policy
basis for a common law claim in Virginia Code sections 18.2-460, 32.1-2, 32.1-27,
54.1-2906, or 54.1-3007 or in the Virginia Board of Nursing regulations).
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asserted based on public policy as articulated in sources outside
the VHRA. Courts considering this issue thus far have uniform-
ly held that Doss abrogated all common law wrongful discharge
claims. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit acknowledged the General Assembly's intent to
prohibit a common law cause of action in Early v. Aerospace
Corp.26 The circuit court held that the 1995 amendments to
the Virginia Human Rights Act abrogated common law causes
of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public poli-
cies articulated in the VHRA"
In one of the first district court cases to consider an alternate
source of public policy for a wrongful discharge claim, the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
found in Leverton v. AlliedSignal Inc.' that the Virginia Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1977 ("Consumer Protection Act)" did
not provide a public policy basis for a Bowman claim."0 In
Leverton, the plaintiff alleged that he was targeted for termina-
tion as a part of a reduction in force due to concerns he ex-
pressed about the company's failure to disclose weaknesses in
polyester tire yarn that the company produced. Leverton con-
tended that his termination was in violation of Virginia public
policy as reflected in the Consumer Protection Act.3" In sup-
port of a motion to dismiss, AlliedSignal argued that the Su-
preme Court of Virginia had rejected the Consumer Protection
Act as a basis for Virginia public policy in Lawrence Chrysler
Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks.32 The district court rejected this ar-
gument, noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not ex-
press any opinion as to whether the Consumer Protection Act
articulated public policy.33 The court stated:
26. No,. 96-2830, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3089, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1998) (un-
published decision).
27. See also Williamson v. Virginia First Sav. Bank, No. 3:98CV38, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6709, at *15 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 1998) ("all common-law wrongful dis-
charge claims have been abrogated to the extent they are based on public policies
reflected in the VHRA").
28. 991 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Va. 1998).
29. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
30. See Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 493.
31. See id. at 490.
32. 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
33. See Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 493.
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The statute does not, in express terms, articulate a public
policy. That, however, does not end the inquiry because the
Supreme Court of Virginia has not held that the policy
predicate of a Bowman claim can exist only if the statute
uses the term "public policy." Moreover,.. . it appears that,
in Bowman the statute did not explicitly use that term. Nor
has the Supreme Court of Virginia articulated a test by
which to determine whether one of the Commonwealth's
many statutes express a public policy which is sufficient to
support a wrongful discharge claim under the Bowman ex-
ception.'
In addition, the court also referred to Miller v. Sevamp, Inc.,"
for the proposition that public policy supporting a wrongful
discharge claim "can be found in statutes that 'protect property
rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare of the peo-
ple in general,' even if the statute does not enunciate public
policy per se."5 With this rationale in mind, the district court
found that the Consumer Protection Act could not provide the
basis for a public policy claim because it does not implicate an
interest identified by Bowman and Miller as adequate for public
policy.3
7
Likewise, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia ruled in McCarthy v. Texas Instruments
Inc.' that no common law wrongful discharge claim is avail-
able for termination in violation of the Virginia public policy
against discrimination. 9 In McCarthy, the plaintiff brought a
wrongful discharge cause of action alleging that- she had been
discriminated against on the basis of her gender in violation of
the public policy found in Title VII, the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, the Virginia Constitution,
and the Fairfax County Human Rights Act.4° The employer
34. Id. at 491.
35. 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
36. Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 492 (quoting Miller, 234 Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at
918).
37. See id. at 493. It is interesting to note that the court in Leverton did not
even address the decision in Doss, although the plaintiffs cause of action arose in
May 1997, well after the effective dates of the VHRA amendments.
38. 999 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1998).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 824.
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sought dismissal on the grounds that Doss precludes a common
law employment discrimination claim.4 The district court
agreed, stating that "[t]he ... reasoning in Doss leads inexora-
bly to the conclusion that a plaintiff who brings a Bowman
claim cannot rely on non-VHRA sources for the stated public
policy of Virginia if that policy is articulated in the VHRA, even
though it may be articulated elsewhere as well."42
The district court noted that the decision of the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Doss either implicitly overruled or made
uncertain the precedential value of its earlier decision in
Bradick v. Grumman Data System Corp.43 in which the su-
preme court held that common law wrongful discharge claims
could *be based on the disability discrimination policy articu-
lated by the VHRA or the Virginia Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities Act.' The court acknowledged that the Bradick deci-
sion was not required to consider the effect of the legislature's
1995 amendments to the VHRA. Moreover, the court found that
to the extent Bradick was inconsistent with Doss, Bradick had
been overruled.45
Concluding that the General Assembly manifested its intent
to alter the common law with respect to wrongful discharge
claims by amending the VHRA, the district court stated:
If plaintiffs were permitted to base Bowman claims on poli-
cies found in the VHRA merely because the same policies
are also found in other statutes, then the Lockhart-amend-
ments would have little effect. Plaintiffs would still-be able
to bring such common law claims in direct contravention of
the General Assembly's efforts, in enacting the amend-
ments, to curb common law claims based on those poli-
cies.'
41. See id.
42. Id. at 830.
43. 254 Va. 156, 486 S.E.2d 545 (1997).
44. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-40 to -46 (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1997); see
Bradick, 254 Va. at 160, 486 S.E.2d at 547.
45. See McCarthy, 999 F. Supp. at 831; Bradick, 254 Va. at 160, 486 S.E.2d at
547 (the cause of action arose prior to the effective date of the amendments).
46. McCarthy, 999 F. Supp. at 830.
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The court acknowledged that its holding would have the effect
of severely curtailing employment discrimination claims brought
under Virginia common law; however, it concluded that such a
result is mandated by Doss.
In a similar vein, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held in Williamson v. Virginia First
Savings Bank' that the Virginia Fair Employment Contract-
ing Act49 cannot provide the basis for a common law wrongful
discharge claim based on Virginia's public policy against gender
discrimination." In Williamson, a bank vice-president alleged
that she was fired after she took time off to care for her sick
children. In dismissing her wrongful discharge claim, the court
stated:
Based on the reasoning in Doss. and the clear mandate of
section 2.1-725(D), this Court must conclude that all com-
mon-law wrongful discharge claims have been abrogated to
the extent they are based on public policies reflected in the
VHRA. This conclusion means that wrongful discharge
claims based on public policies expressed in other state
statutes that just happen to also be expressed in the VHRA
are not cognizable.5
The court reasoned that to interpret the word "reflected" in the
Doss decision as applying only when a claim is based solely on
the VHRA would circumvent the mandate of Virginia Code
section 2.1-725(D) and the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding
in Doss.52 The court found it dispositive that the plaintiff's
"wrongful discharge claim [did] not rest on a statutory public
policy that [was] not expressed in the VHRA."3 Therefore, it
felt compelled to dismiss her common law claim.54
Thus, even after Doss, Virginia lawyers will continue to see
wrongful discharge claims based on the supreme court's holding
47. See id. at 831.
48. No. 3:98CV38, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6709, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 1998).
49. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-374 to -376.1 (Rep. Vol. 1994).
50. See Williamson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6709, at *15.
51. Id. (emphasis in original).
52. See id. at *15-16.
53. Id. at *17.
54. See ic.
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in Bowman. While the supreme court made clear that, as a
result of the 1995 amendments, the VHRA cannot be used as
the statutory expression of Virginia's public policy against dis-
crimination in a common law wrongful discharge action, the
supreme court left the door open for consideration of claims
based on alternate sources of public policy.
Other than the VHRA, there are a number of Virginia stat-
utes that express a public policy against discrimination.55 In
addition, the Virginia Constitution, particularly article I, section
11,56 may provide a public policy basis for a wrongful dis-
charge claim alleging racial and/or sexual discrimination. Arti-
cle I, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution guarantees the
"right to be free from any governmental discrimination on the
basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national ori-
gin."" The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that this pro-
vision "prohibits invidious, arbitrary discrimination upon the
basis of sex.""8
55. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-374 (Repl. Vol. 1994) (declaring it the public
policy of the Commonwealth to "eliminate all discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin from the employment practices of the Commonwealth,
its agencies, and government contractors"); id. § 8.01-42.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (creating a
statutory cause of action for intimidation, harassment, or violence based on "racial,
religious, or ethnic animosity"); id. § 11-44 (Repl. Vol. 19.93) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in the soliciting or awarding of contracts by public bodies on the basis of "race,
religion, color, sex or national origin"); id. § 11-51 (Repl. Vol. 1993) (prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination by any contractor on the basis of "race, religion, color, sex or
national origin"); id. § 15.2-965 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (permitting counties, towns and
cities to enact ordinances prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex . . . national origin, age, marital status, or disability"); id. § 15.2-1604
(Repl. Vol. 1997) (making it unlawful to discriminate in employment by constitutional
officers on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin"); id. § 36-96.1
(Repl. Vol. 1996) (declaring it the public policy of the Commonwealth to prohibit
discrimination in housing on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
elderliness, familial status, or handicap"); id. § 38.2-2212(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998)' (pro-
hibiting an insurer from refusing to renew motor vehicle insurance on the basis of
"age, sex, residence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry, or marital status");
id. § 38.2-2213 (Repl. Vol. 1994) (prohibiting an insurer from issuing motor vehicle
insurance on the basis of "age, sex, residence, race, color, creed, national origin, an-
cestry, [or] marital status"); id. § 38.2-4312(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (prohibiting a
health maintenance organization from discriminating on the basis of "race, creed,
color, sex or religion"); id. § 59.1-21.21:1 (Repl. Vol. 1998) (prohibiting discrimination
with respect to any credit transaction on the basis of "race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, or marital status, or age").
56. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
57. Id.
58. Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973).
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In addition to the Virginia Constitution and other state stat-
utes expressing a public policy against unlawful discrimination,
there are a number of local ordinances that also express public
policy against unlawful discrimination which might support a
Bowman claim.59 In Glaser v. Titan Corp.,0  the Fairfax
County Circuit Court held that the Fairfax County Human
Rights Ordinance constituted a "specific Virginia statute" suffi-
cient to support a Bowman claim.6
Finally, federal public policy as articulated in federal statutes
may be asserted as a basis for a common law wrongful dis-
charge claim, although it is doubtful that such claims will.suc-
ceed. In Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks,62 the
Supreme Court of Virginia suggested that a Bowman claim has
to be supported by a Virginia statute as the expression of pub-
lic policy." This conclusion also has been reached by courts
considering the issue after Doss.'
IIR. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
During the period under review, Virginia courts decided a
number of significant cases concerning issues surrounding con-
tracts of employment, both express and implied. The majority of
notable decisions arose in the context of covenants against
competition and claims for an implied contract based on em-
ployee handbooks.
59. See, e.g., Fairfax County Human Rights Ordinance, FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA.
CODE §§ 11-1-1 to -1-22 (1976).
60. 12 VA. LAW. WKLY. 203 (July 21, 1997).
61. See id.
62. 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996).
63. See id. at 96, 465 S.E.2d at 808.
64. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Texas Instruments Inc., 999 F. Supp. 823, 829 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (rejecting Title VII as a public policy basis for a common law wrongful dis-
charge claim); but see Marshall v. Obstetrics & Gynecology Ltd. of Radford, No. 97-
08-35R (W.D. Va. July 2, 1998) (unpublished in print or electronic media) (overruling
a motion to dismiss a wrongful discharge claim based in part on Title VII as a public
policy basis).
1998] 1209
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A. Non-Competition Agreements
Both employers and employees achieved favorable results in
litigation surrounding covenants not to compete contained in
employment contracts. One of the more significant opinions
addressed the issue of whether a covenant not to compete is
assignable. In Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Hardee,65 the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit afrmed the
dismissal of a breach of contract claim on the basis that non-
competition agreements are not assignable to a successor em-
ployer without the employee's consent." The Reynolds '&
Reynolds Company ('Reynolds") purchased the assets of the
plaintiffs employer, Jordan Graphics Inc. ("Jordan"). Hardee's
employment agreement with Jordan was included in the sale.
On the day of the sale, Hardee was terminated by Jordan and
Reynolds offered to re-hire him under a new employment agree-
ment with a more restrictive non-competition provision. Hardee
refused to sign the new agreement, but offered to work for
Reynolds under the same terms as his prior agreement with
Jordan. Reynolds refused and thereafter filed suit to enforce the
restrictive covenant alleging breach of contract and misappropri-
ation of trade secrets.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted Hardee's motion to dismiss the company's
breach of contract claim, finding that Reynolds lacked standing
to enforce the restrictive covenant.' Reynolds appealed. In
aTh-ming dismissal of the claim, the Fourth Circuit adopted the
reasoning of the district court, which found that, because per-
sonal services agreements are not assignable under Virginia law
without consent of the employee, non-competition covenants also
may not be assigned."
65. No. 96-2077, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36368, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 1997)
(unpublished decision), affg 932 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Va. 1996).
66. See id. at *6.
67. See id. at *2-3.
68. See Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Hardee, 932 F. Supp. 149, 155 (E.D. Va.
1996).
69. See Reynolds & Reynolds, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36368, at *3.
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Circuit courts in Virginia also had the opportunity in 1997 to
address claims arising out of covenants not to compete. In Doc-
tors Blum, Newman, Blackstock & Associates, Optometrists, P.C.
v. Jessee,0 the Circuit Court for the City of Salem upheld a
non-competition provision in an employment agreement which
restricted the defendant from practicing optometry within a
twenty-five-mile radius of his former employer's nine offices for
a period of three years.71 The defendant optometrist, who had
resigned after nine years of employment with the plaintiff, ar-
gued that the agreement was "overbroad, ambiguous, punitive,
and unenforceable."72 Finding that the employer had a legiti-
mate business interest in preventing the defendant from using
confidential information gained during his employment, the
circuit court found that the restraint of trade contained in the
non-competition provision was not unduly harsh or oppressive
in curtailing the optometrist's efforts to earn a living.73 On the
other hand, the circuit court found that a liquidated damages
provision in the contract was unenforceable as it constituted a
penalty clause.74
In a similar fashion, the Fairfax County Circuit Court upheld
a non-competition agreement in Allen J. Zuccari, Inc. v. Ad-
ams.75 The restrictive covenant in Allen J. Zuccari forbade the
defendant from doing business with or disclosing information
about the plaintiff's clients for a period of five years following
the termination of employment.76 When the defendant resigned
to form his own risk management company, the plaintiff sued,
claiming that the defendant was diverting business and had not
returned company property.77
The circuit court found that the restrictive covenant in,
Adams' agreement was reasonable for protection of the
plaintiff's legitimate business interests. The circuit court also
70. 42 Va. Cir. 187 (Salem City 1997).
71. See id at 187.
72. Id.
73. See id at 188.
74. See i&i at 189 (citing 301 Dahlgren Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Supervisors,
240 Va. 200, 396 S.E.2d 651 (1990)).
75. 42 Va. Cir. 132 (Fairfax County 1997).
76. See id at 133.
77. See id. at 133-34.
78. See id. at 134.
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found that the non-compete clause was reasonable as it did not
preclude the defendant from earning a livelihood.79 Finally, the
restrictive covenant was found reasonable from a public policy
perspective, as employers are entitled to protect their client
base from ex-employees. 0 The circuit court specifically rejected
the defendant's arguments that the agreement was unreason-
able as to time and geographic scope. The circuit court found
that there is no requirement that a non-compete clause contain
a geographic limitation and that a five-year period limitation
served to protect the plaintiff from employees who try to com-
pete with their former employer after gaining experience and
contacts from the employer."' Finally, the circuit court dis-
agreed with the defendant's contention that the non-competition
agreement was invalid because it was an at-will contract that
,was not supported by consideration. 2 Relying on Paramount
Termite Control Co. v. Rector,83 the circuit court held that the
defendant's continued employment after he had signed the em-
ployment contract was sufficient consideration to support the
validity of the non-competition provision.'
A conflicting conclusion was reached by the Loudoun County
Circuit Court in Statkus v. Loudoun Anesthesia Associates,
LLC,85 where the circuit court considered a non-competition
provision contained in an operating agreement. In Statkus, five
physicians joined to form a limited liability company. The doc-
tors executed an operating agreement which included a provi-
sion whereby the doctors agreed that for a period of one year
following withdrawal from the company, the withdrawing part-
ner would not engage in a competitive business in Loudoun
County." The agreement further provided that the doctors ex-
pressly agreed that the terms, duration, and geographic scope of
the restrictive covenant were reasonable. 7 The plaintiff was
later expelled from the company and filed a declaratory judg-
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 134-35.
82. See id. at 135.
83. 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989).
84. See Allen J. Zuccari, 42 Va. Cir. at 135.
85. 42 Va. Cir. 35 (Loudoun County 1996).
86. See id. at 35-36.
87. See id.
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ment proceeding asking the circuit court to determine the rights
of the parties under the restrictive covenant. The circuit court
found that the restrictive covenant was invalid and unen-
forceable because it represented an unreasonable restraint on
the plaintiff's ability to practice anesthesiology and pain man-
agement in Loudoun County." Notably, the circuit court
placed no significance on the recitation in the agreement where-
by the parties agreed that the terms, duration and geographic
scope of the restrictive covenant were reasonable, finding that
"questions of reasonableness or legal efficacy are ones for the
court, and not for the parties, to decide." 9
B. Employee Handbooks as Contracts
Federal and state courts in Virginia generally have reiused to
allow breach of contract claims based on employee handbooks to
proceed during the period of review. In Rhymer v. Yokohama
Tire Corp.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered a claim by a former employee alleging that
an employee handbook constituted an implied contract that he
would be terminated only "for cause." 1 The employee testified
that when he was given the handbook he was told that "it
guaranteed his employment if he did an acceptable job." 2
When he was later terminated for poor performance, he filed
suit in federal court alleging age discrimination and breach of
an implied contract of employment. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary
judgment to the former employer, and the employee appealed.
Reviewing the claim de novo, the Fourth Circuit found that a
"common sense reading of the employee handbook" defeated the
employee's claim.'.3 In affirming the grant of summary judg-
ment to the employer, the court noted that nowhere in the
handbook did it provide that an employee could only be dis-
88. See id. at 38.
89. Id at 38-39.
90. No. 96-1191, 1997 U.S. App..LEXIS 675, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1997) (un-
published decision).
91. See i& at *12.
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id- at *7.
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charged for cause; therefore, the employer was not limited in its
ability to terminate employees.94
Similarly, in Carter v. Times-World Corp.,95 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia grant-
ed summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to a wrong-
ful discharge claim based on breach of an employment contract
allegedly created by an employee handbook." The plaintiff fo-
cused her claim on the use of the word "compensation" in the
handbook as well as certain language regarding the employer's
long-term disability plan.97 The district court rejected both ar-
guments, finding that "the mere use of the word 'compensation'
in an employee handbook does not create an employment con-
tract under Virginia law.""5 The court also found that the long-
term disability plan documents specifically stated that it did
not create a contract; therefore, the plaintiffs claim was
meritless.99
Finally, in Bryarly v. Shenandoah University,' the
Winchester Circuit Court held that provisions in a policy manu-
al could not be inferred to contravene employment at-will.10'
The plaintiff was employed by the Shenandoah University
("University") as a publications manager at a private non-profit
institute which was part of the University. Following a perfor-
mance review, the plaintiff was informed that her primary
responsibilities were being eliminated; therefore, her employ-
ment was terminated effective immediately. The plaintiff sued,
alleging breach of employment contract based on a policy manu-
al provided to her by the University.102
Sustaining the University's demurrer, the circuit court found
it significant that the introduction to the policy manual stated
that: "the right of the employee or the University to terminate
94. See id. at *13-14.
95. No. 96-0709-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10743, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 23, 1997)
(unpublished decision).
96. See id. at *12.
97. See id.
98. Id. (citing Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 1995)).
99. See id.
100. 41 Va. Cir. 238 (Winchester City 1996).
101. See id. at 238.
102. See id. at 240-41.
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the employment relationship 'at-will' is recognized herein and
affirmed as a condition of employment. These policies are not to
be construed as a contract, guarantee, or condition of employ-
ment."0 3 The circuit court found this statement to be a clear
declaration of at-will employment and that other provisions of
the policy manual "were simply some of the conditions of her
continued at-will employment.""°
IV. CONCLUSION
Common law wrongful discharge claims based on Virginia
public policy continue to be the primary source of employment
law litigation since amendments to the VHRA were enacted.
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Doss v.
Jamco, Inc."0 5 closed the door on common law claims based
upon the public policy articulated in the VHRA, the supreme
court's unwillingness to address whether alternate sources may
provide the basis for such claims leaves the door wide open for
continued litigation on this issue. Relying on Doss, employers
have thus far successfully argued that all common law wrongful
discharge claims have been abrogated. Nonetheless, until the
Supreme Court of Virginia issues an opinion squarely address-
ing this question, plaintiffs will continue to pursue common law
wrongful discharge claims based on other Virginia and federal
statutes, the Virginia Constitution, and local ordinances.
In the employment contracts arena, both employees and em-
ployers noted victories in litigation concerning the effectiveness
of covenants not to compete. As a result, claims arising from
such provisions in employment contracts will likely continue as
employers aggressively pursue enforcement of non-competition
provisions and employees seek to evade the restrictions of a
covenant not to compete.
Finally, although employees continue to assert handbook
provisions as indicia of an employment contract, Virginia courts
are quick to conclude that statements included in handbooks
103. Id. at 240.
104. Id. at 243 (quoting Graham v. Central Fidelity Bank, 245 Va. 395, 399, 428
S.E.2d 916, 918 (1993)).
105. 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
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expressing that employment is at-will clearly rebut such claims.
Thus, astute employers will continue to draft their policy manu-
als to include such disclaimers.
